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Abstract 
Background and Objectives: Mechanisms of engagement and disengagement of attention to 
emotional information are thought to contribute to the onset and maintenance of anxiety and 
depression, a conclusion based largely on findings in analogue subclinical samples. However, we 
argue that traditionally defined analogue samples can be misleading.  Firstly, research has 
challenged the adequacy of conventional measures of subclinical traits by illustrating that 
supposedly distinct scales are highly inter-correlated and do not therefore measure independent 
constructs. Secondly, recent research in clinical groups has revealed results opposite to those 
expected from the analogue literature, suggesting speeded, rather than impaired, disengagement 
from threat. Methods: We present analogue findings, from a sample of 70 healthy participants, 
allowing a purer distinction between the phenomenology of anxiety versus depression using the 
orthogonal traits of positive and negative affect to classify individuals. Results: Using emotional 
peripheral cueing we found that, at short cue durations, dysphoric individuals’ (those with low 
positive and high negative affect) attention to facial expressions was slowed by emotional 
compared to neutral invalid cues. Limitations: Limitations included a small sample size and 
limited generalisability due to sampling from a student population.  Conclusions: The data suggest 
that, in line with the previous subclinical literature, dysphoric individuals are slow to disengage 
attention from emotional information at early stages of processing and are consistent with the 
possibility that patterns of orienting of attention might be qualitatively different in subclinical 
versus clinical populations.   
235 words. 
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Introduction 
Emotional cuing reveals engagement and disengagement of selective attention. A substantive 
body of empirical work has demonstrated that emotional material, relative to neutral, is prioritised 
for attentional processing (Yiend, 2010; Vuilleumier, 2005). One paradigm used to examine these 
effects is the peripheral cueing task (Posner 1980) in which visual onsets (cues) are assumed to 
direct participants’ attention towards the location in which they appear. Reaction times to detect 
targets subsequently appearing in cued (valid) or uncued (invalid) locations can be used to assess 
the relative attentional costs and benefits of different types of cue (e.g., those with positive and 
negative valence) and are taken to reflect the cognitive mechanisms of disengagement and 
engagement of selective attention, respectively (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Yiend & 
Mathews, 2001; Fox, Mathews, Calder & Yiend, 2007). Although this emotional version of the 
cuing methodology has been criticized (Clarke, MacLeod, & Guastella, 2013; Mogg, Holmes, 
Garner, & Bradley 2008), expert opinions remain mixed (Yiend, 2010) and there is widespread 
agreement that the emotional cuing task has played an important part in the advancement of our 
understanding of the attentional mechanisms associated with anxiety and depression.  
Attentional biases in anxiety and depression. Mechanisms of engagement and disengagement of 
attention to emotional information, along with other cognitive biases, are thought to contribute to 
the onset and maintenance of psychological disorders.  For instance, group differences in biased 
processing related to pathology tend to be present at low intensities of affective content and are 
especially evident where stimuli are disorder-relevant (Yiend, 2010). Anxious individuals, for 
example, show increased attentional orienting towards the location of anxiety-relevant versus 
neutral stimuli at short stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs: Mathews, Fox, Yiend & Calder 2003; 
Yiend & Mathews 2001) and detect fear-related relative to happy faces more efficiently in an 
attentional blink paradigm (Fox, Russo, & Georgiou, 2005) . In depression, increased attentional 
orienting towards the location of depression-relevant stimuli usually occurs at longer SOAs (eg. 
Donaldson, Lam & Mathews, 2007; Joorman & Gotlib 2007). One possible explanation for this 
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pattern in depression is that these individuals fail to inhibit depression-relevant information once it 
has been attended. Supporting this, depressed participants have been found to show impaired 
disengagement of attention from negatively valenced stimuli at longer stimulus presentations in 
both cueing and attentional blink paradigms (Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven, Franck & Crombez 
2005; Leyman, De Raedt,  Schacht & Koster 2007; Koster, De Raedt, Verschuere, Tibboel & 
DeJong 2009; Koster, De Raedt, Leyman & De Lissnyder 2010), while anxious participants show 
delayed disengagement from anxiety-relevant information at relatively short stimulus presentations 
(Fox et al, 2001; Yiend & Mathews, 2001).  
Evidence suggests that biases in attention to emotional material are linked to traits predisposing 
people to depression and anxiety rather than the acute affective states themselves. For instance, in 
depression similar biases have been found in recovered depressed participants and also in never-
depressed daughters of depressed mothers (Joorman & Gotlib 2007; Joorman, Talbot & Gotlib 
2007). Most of the engagement and disengagement effects described above have used analogue 
samples of preselected individuals from the healthy population. Although not meeting criteria for a 
clinical disorder themselves, these individuals are assumed to perform like those who do. In the 
literature on anxiety and attention, in many cases this assumption has proven justified. For 
example, individuals with elevated trait anxiety show enhanced attentional biases toward threat 
following a similar pattern to that found in Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) patients, on 
emotional Stroop and attentional probe tasks (Yiend, 2010).  
Recent work on engagement and disengagement effects using the emotional cuing paradigm 
described above has, however, raised the possibility that the continuity between analogue and 
clinically anxious samples may not be ubiquitous. In work reported by Yiend and colleagues 
(2015), two separate studies investigated individuals diagnosed with GAD, healthy volunteers, and 
individuals with high trait anxiety (but not meeting GAD diagnostic criteria). While previous 
research using cuing methods in studies with high trait anxious participants suggested that negative 
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attentional bias is due to slowed disengagement of attention from negative information (e.g., Fox et 
al, 2001), Yiend et al. (2015) found faster disengagement from negative (angry and fearful) faces in 
the clinically anxious (GAD) group, suggesting that once a clinical disorder has developed, the 
pattern of attentional orienting might actually reverse; the attentional ‘hold’ of threat seen in high 
trait samples, may become an attentional ‘avoidance’ effect with the onset of GAD.  
The inadequacy of traditional trait anxiety and depression measures. Discontinuities of this sort 
between subclinical samples and their corresponding clinical diagnoses highlight a potential 
difficulty with the use of subclinical trait measures as analogue markers of psychopathology. One 
possible confound is that some of the instruments commonly used to measure trait anxiety and trait 
depression do not adequately distinguish these conditions. Thus, while anxiety and depression are 
phenomenologically distinct (anxiety reflecting agitation, worry and dread but depression reflecting 
gloom, apathy and hopelessness), measures of trait anxiety and depression are frequently highly 
correlated (coefficients in the range .45-.75 according to Clark and Watson, 1991) and item content 
can overlap. Such difficulties have led to alternative conceptualisations of anxiety and depression, 
with the aim of improving their discriminant validity (e.g., Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). This 
approach might allow for a better understanding of the unique patterns of cognitive biases 
associated with anxiety and depression.  
The positive and negative trait affect alternative. To illustrate, Watson and colleagues (e.g., 
Watson, Clark & Carey, 1988) argue that subjective emotional experience falls into two broad 
categories: positive (PA) and negative affect (NA: Watson, Clark & Tellegen 1988). An individual 
with high trait PA will have a general tendency to experience a greater intensity and frequency of 
positive mood states, whilst an individual with high trait NA will experience a greater intensity and 
frequency of negative mood states. Depression and anxiety are highly correlated with trait NA, both 
concurrently and prospectively, whilst only depression is systematically related to PA (Watson & 
Clark 1995). Watson and Clark’s tripartite model proposes that while depression and anxiety are 
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both characterised by high negative affect, only depressed individuals experience low levels of 
positive affect (Clark & Watson 1991a). This approach suggests that using self-reported scales of 
positive and negative affective traits can therefore provide a more valid way to investigate the 
phenomenology of anxiety versus depression.  
 As discussed by others (e.g. Koster et al. 2005), there are strong arguments for exploring 
how trait PA and NA relate to attentional biases, rather than focusing on traditionally defined 
concepts of anxiety and depression. Firstly, self-report measures of anxiety and depression are 
typically highly correlated creating difficulties in independently investigating these constructs 
(Clark & Watson 1991b, Koster et al. 2005, Koster et al. 2009, Koster et al. 2010).  In contrast, the 
constructs of PA and NA are orthogonal and can therefore be investigated independently of each 
other (Watson et al. 1988). Secondly, evaluating trait PA and NA encourages the exploration of a 
wider area of emotional space and can potentially generate results more readily applicable across 
both the general population and the extremes of psychopathology. Finally, this approach is also in 
line with the increasingly popular focus on functional mechanisms and transdiagnostic processes as 
an important way to understand a wide variety of psychopathologies (Harvey, 2008; Yiend, 
Savulich, Coughtrey & Shafran, 2011). 
Covert or overt attention? The emotional attentional cueing task has generally been assumed by 
previous studies to measure covert, as opposed to overt, attention, since participants are instructed 
to fixate the central cross throughout each trial, without moving their eyes.  However this 
assumption can only be justified if eye movements are measured during each trial, to confirm that 
central fixation is indeed maintained.  Many studies omit this methodological check for practical 
reasons, such as the need for specialist equipment and the additional burden on participants. The 
distinction between covert and over attention is especially important in the context of 
psychopathology, since it clarifies which mechanisms are maladaptive: the internal, covert, process 
of assigning attentional priority, and/or the physical manifestation of attentional selection, namely 
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moving the eyes to a salient stimulus. Here, we used a compromise solution to check the 
assumption of eye fixation, by measuring eye movements in a subset of our sample.   
  
 In summary, the present research aimed to investigate how positive and negative trait affect 
influences covert attentional orienting to emotional facial expressions, using an emotional cueing 
paradigm with emotional and neutral faces. Single peripheral cues were used to investigate the 
allocation of spatial attention at short and long cue durations across a range of emotions in order to 
evaluate both early and late stages of information processing.  We hypothesised that dysphoric 
individuals, defined as those with low PA and high NA, would show emotion specific biases at 
longer cue durations, indicating reduced inhibition of emotionally valenced stimuli. We chose this 
categorical approach in preference to a dimensional design in order to most closely map the present 
data onto the previous subclinical literature, which has almost exclusively compared discrete 
groups selected to differ in trait anxiety/depression level1.  We wished to examine whether those 
findings would replicate in our trait affect defined groups, or alternatively, whether results would 
now align more closely to the opposite findings recently reported in clinical (GAD) samples (e.g. 
Yiend et al 2015). 
 
1. Method 
2.1 Design 
An emotional cueing paradigm was used to evaluate spatial attentional orienting to facial 
expressions of emotion in a sample of seventy undergraduate and postgraduate students. Effects 
were compared across four groups of participants selected according to trait PANAS scores relative 
to normative means from a large UK non-clinical sample (Crawford & Henry, 2004, n=1003). The 
four groups were denoted ‘high affect’ (high positive and negative trait affect); ‘dysphoric’ (high 
                                                 
1 Furthermore, the multi-factorial design of the experiment meant that regression analysis was not feasible as the main 
analytical strategy. However, subsets of the data could be examined post-hoc to test their validity across the whole 
sample. 
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negative and low positive trait affect), ‘euphoric’ (high positive and low negative trait affect) and 
‘low affect’2 (low positive and low negative trait affect). The factorial experimental design was 
devised to contrast the effects of Trial Type (valid, invalid), Emotion (emotional, neutral) and Cue 
Duration (Short: <=100ms, Long: >= 500ms) on spatial orienting across the four groups, using 
target response time as the dependent variable. The categorisation of cue duration was designed to 
capture early automatic and later strategic processes.  
 
2.2 Participants 
Seventy participants from Oxford University were screened and selected into one of the four groups 
based on their scores on the trait version of Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Watson et al. 1988). Participants were asked to rate to what extent they generally experienced each 
of 10 positive emotions (interested, excited, strong, enthusiastic, proud, alert, inspired, determined, 
attentive, active) and 10 negative emotions (distressed, upset, guilty, scared, hostile, irritable, 
ashamed, nervous, jittery, afraid) on a scale from 1 (“very slightly or not at all”) to 5 (“extremely”). 
Possible scores on each subscale range from 10 to 50. The PANAS subscales are stable over a 2 
month period, are highly internally consistent, and orthogonal (Watson et al. 1988). 
 
Those with both PA and NA scores above the normative mean for that subscale (normative means: 
31 and 16, respectively, Crawford & Henry, 2004) comprised the ‘high affect’ group (n=19). Those 
with PA below and NA above the normative mean were designated the ‘dysphoric’ group (n=20). 
The ‘euphoric’ group had PA above and NA below the normative mean (n=20). Finally, those with 
both PA and NA below the normative mean were classed as the ‘low affect’ group (n=11). 
 
2.3 Materials 
                                                 
2 Participant numbers in the low affect group were too low (n=11) for meaningful interpretation and 
therefore are presented for completeness only and not interpreted or discussed. 
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2.3.1 Stimuli. Facial expression stimuli used as cues were taken from the Ekman series (Ekman & 
Friesen 1976), and the JACFEE and JACNeuF sets (Matsumoto & Ekman 1988). Emotional cues 
comprised equal nubers of faces expressing the emotions of happiness, sadness and fear, while 
neutral cues were facial expressions showing no emotion.  Twenty different identities were selected 
based on expression recognition norms provided with the stimuli sets. The stimuli were 
monochrome photographs of men and women looking straight ahead and were cropped to exclude 
hair and other non-facial distracters. Six practice cues were made using other identities.   
 
2.3.2 Attentional Task. The attentional cuing task comprises valid and invalid trials and was used in 
a standard factorial design to contrast responses to emotional and neutral cues presented at either 
short to long cue durations.  Stimuli were organised into three blocks of 240 trials per block, 720 
trials in total. The factor Emotion comprised three types of emotional cue: sad, happy, and fearful 
and one type of non-emotional cue: neutral. The factor Cue Duration comprised 2 levels, short (50 
or  100ms) and long (500 or1000ms). There is no clear consensus about what durations of cue 
exposure best capture early automatic and longer strategic processes in selective attention.  We 
therefore sampled two different durations (in equal proportion) at each level, in order to best reflect 
the typical durations found in the previous literature.  The factor Trial Type was operationalized 
using a predictive cuing ratio of 2:1, valid: invalid trials, such that cues indicated a 60% likelihood 
of the target occurring in the cued location. Valid trials were those where the location of the target 
was the same as the preceding cue; invalid trials were those in which the cue and target appeared in 
opposite locations. All factors were combined using a fully crossed factorial design within blocks. 
For example, within each block 80 trials (1/3) were invalid and 160 (2/3) were valid (in total 240 
invalid and 480 valid trials) and levels of Emotion and Cue Duration were nested within each type 
of trial.  Where a task has a multi-level within participants’ factor structure, as here, it is important 
to ensure that the number of observations per cell provides adequate sampling of the variance in 
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participants’ responses to each condition within the task design. In this experiment there were a 
minimum of 30 observations per condition overall within our analytical design (e.g. 30 invalid, or 
60 valid, trials per emotion per cue duration). The task was delivered using E prime software 
version 1.1 and trial conditions were presented in a fully randomised order.  
 
2.4 Procedure 
The study was approved by the local University of Oxford research ethics committee and 
participants gave written informed consent. They were seated 100 cm from the screen to ensure a 
consistent viewing angle3. Instructions were presented on the computer screen, followed by 18 
practice trials and 720 trials in total. Individual trials started with a central fixation cross presented 
for 1000ms, followed by a neutral, sad, happy or fearful face for 50, 100, 500 or 1000ms, which 
appeared on either the left or the right of the screen. The face cue was then removed from the 
screen, replaced by a target letter, either an ‘E’ or an ‘F’, and presented either at the same location 
as the cue (valid trials), or at the opposite location (invalid trials). The target remained on the 
screen until response or for 5000ms, whichever occurred first. On practice trials, but not 
experimental trials, automated feedback (an auditory tone and visual display: ‘Incorrect Response’) 
was used to alert participants to errors. The visual angle between cue and target was 6º and targets 
subtended 0.37º of visual angle. Instructions asked participants to keep their gaze fixed on the 
central cross throughout each trial. They were told that a face would appear briefly followed by a 
                                                 
3 The visual angle between the centre of each stimulus in the pair and the central fixation cross is a 
crucial parameter in attentional bias studies and it this which determines the correct viewing 
distance, according to the equation:  
 
λ = h / d , 
 
where λ = visual angle in degrees;  h= ‘on screen’ distance in cm;  d = distance from stimulus to 
eye in cm.  
and allows good comparability across different studies. The standard visual angle in 
methodologically tight attentional bias studies is around 6 degrees. Full methodological details can 
be found in Yiend, J., & Mathews, A. (2004).  
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letter and that their task was to identify the letter as quickly but as accurately as possible by 
pressing the corresponding button (upper for F; lower for E) on a serial response box.   
 
For a randomly selected subsample of 15 participants (21% of the sample), eye movement 
monitoring headgear was fitted and calibrated prior to starting the task. Horizontal eye-movements 
from the right eye were monitored throughout the experimental task using the IRIS eye movement 
measurement system, (SKALAR, Cambridge Research Systems).  
After the attentional task all participants completed the following questionnaires: the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Steer & Brown 1996); the trait version of the Spielberger State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger 1983) and, where more than two months had elapsed 
since recruitment, the trait version of the PANAS (Watson et al. 1988). Each session lasted 
approximately one hour.  
 
2. Results 
3.1 Sample characteristics 
The sample of 70 consisted of 26 male and 44 female students, aged 18 to 30. The mean score on 
the Positive Affect subscale of the PANAS was 31, and on the Negative Affect subscale 19. 
Descriptive data for each group is summarised in Table 1. As shown, groups differed significantly 
in PA and NA, in the expected directions according to group assignment.   
 
 
 
Table 1. Participant Characteristics  
 
 Group 1 
(High Affect) 
Group 2  
(Dysphoric) 
Group 3 
(Euphoric)  
Group 4 
(Low 
Affect)  
p 
 High NA Low NA  
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 High PA Low PA High PA Low PA  
N 19 20 20 11  
Gender: males/females 
 
7/12 7/13 9/11 3/8 ns 
Age (years) 
 mean (sd) 
20 (1.1) 21 (2.4) 21 (2.5) 21 (1.3) ns 
PANAS- Positive 
Affect mean (sd) 
34 (3.3) b  25 (3.9) a  36 (3.2) b  27 (3.7) a  <.0001 
PANAS- Negative 
Affect  mean (sd) 
24 (6.5) b  23 (5.5) b 13 (2.1) a  15 (3.1) a  <.0001 
STAI -Trait 
 mean(sd) 
 
 
 
49 (10) c  49 (7.1) c  33 (6.0) a  42 (4.9) b <.0001 
BDI 
 mean (sd) 
9.2 (6.9) a 11 (8.0) b 4.1 (3.6) a  8.1 (4.1) a <.006  
 
 
a,b,c means with the same superscript do not differ significantly  
NA= negative affect; PA = positive affect; PANAS = Positive and negative affect schedule; STAI = 
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; BDI= Beck Depression Inventory 
 
 
3.2 Attentional Effects 
Participants made errors on 252 trials (1.5% of the total number of trials). These trials were 
removed from the dataset. Reaction times less than 100ms (1.3% of correct trials) or greater than 2 
standard deviations above the mean (2.4% of correct trials), were considered outliers and removed. 
Once error trials and outliers had been removed, reaction times over the whole sample formed an 
approximately normal distribution, with a mean reaction time of 564.5ms (sd = 95.8 ms). Eye 
movement data showed that the subset of participants sampled were successful in keeping their 
eyes centrally fixated on 86% of trials in total.  
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A mixed model ANOVA of design Group (high affect, dysphoric, euphoric, low affect) x Cue 
Duration (short, long) x Trial Type (valid, invalid) x Emotion (emotional, neutral) was conducted 
on mean reaction times to detect the target4.  
 
There were significant main effects of Cue Duration, F (1, 66) = 16, p < 0.01, partial 2  = 0.20; 
Trial Type, F (1, 66) = 14, p<0.01, partial 2  = 0.18; and Emotion, F (1,66)= 4.6, p < 0.05, partial 
2  = 0.07.  Main effects were qualified by the significant interaction of Cue Duration x Trial Type 
x Emotion x Group, F (3, 66) = 2.8, p < 0.05, partial 2  = 0.11. To interpret this further within-
group ANOVAs of design Cue Duration (short, long) x Trial Type (valid, invalid) x Emotion 
(emotional, neutral) were conducted separately for each group. For those groups in which this 
three-way interaction remained, further follow up analyses were conducted until the specific nature 
of the effect was interpretable. Condition means for the interaction are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Mean reaction times in ms on the attentional task. Standard deviation in parentheses. 
 
  Valid Trials Invalid Trials 
 Cue duration Emotional cue Neutral cue Emotional cue Neutral cue 
Group 1  
(High Affect, n=19) 
     
 Short (50/100ms) 571.5 
(78.5) 
578.3 
(85.9) 
558.8  
(88.5) 
558.9  
(87.2) 
 Long (500/1000 ms) 
 
557.2  
(71.9) 
554.7 
(72.4) 
548.9  
(75.0) 
544.5  
(74.5) 
Group 2  
(Dysphoric, n=20) 
     
                                                 
4 Running the same analyses but specifying separate levels for individual emotional categories 
(fear, happy, sad) revealed that the effects reported were not qualified by the specific type of 
emotion. 
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 Short (50/100ms) 554.4 
(57.7) 
556.4 
(64.4) 
542.3 
(59.0) 
528.4 
(58.6) 
 Long (500/1000 ms) 
 
544.6  
(55.0) 
538.7 
(60.4) 
539.9 
(58.6) 
539.3 
(55.9) 
Group 3  
(Euphoric, n=20) 
     
 Short (50/100ms) 562.8 
(57.7) 
555.5 
(52.8) 
537.6 
(62.1) 
536.6 
(60.4) 
 Long (500/1000 ms) 
 
552.9 
(58.6) 
546.0 
(59.0) 
528.5 
(59.0) 
530.0 
(57.7) 
Group 4  
(Low Affect, n=11) 
     
 Short (50/100ms) 576.3 
(83.2) 
566.8 
(80.9) 
566.9 
(91.5) 
577.8 
(99.2) 
 Long (500/1000 ms) 
 
566.8 
(83.9) 
550.6 
(79.6) 
565.2 
(103.8) 
556.5 
(99.5) 
 
 
Group One (‘high affect’: high PA and NA). There was one significant main effect, Cue Duration 
(F(1,18) = 8.9, p < 0.005, partial 2  = 0.33), reflecting slowing at short (mean = 567 ms, S.E. = 
19.1) compared to long durations, (mean = 551 ms, S.E. = 16.1ms). All other effects and 
interactions were non-significant.  
 
Group Two (‘dysphoric’: high NA, low PA). There was one significant main effect of Trial Type 
(F(1,19) = 7.3, p < 0.05, partial 2  = 0.27 ), qualified by a significant interaction of  Emotion x Cue 
Duration x Trial Type, F(1,19) = 6.5, p < 0.05, partial 2  = 0.23. Examining each cue duration 
separately revealed no significant effects at long Cue Durations (all Fs <0.8), but a significant 
Emotion x Trial Type interaction, (F(1, 19) = 6.9, p <0.05, partial 2  = 0.23) at short Cue 
Durations. Pairwise comparisons (for short cue duration data) revealed that on invalid trials, 
reaction times were significantly slowed on emotional (mean = 542.3 ms, S.E. = 13.2ms) compared 
to neutral (mean = 528.4ms, S.E. = 13.1 ms) trials, t (19)= 2.2, p < 0.05. On valid trials, reaction 
times to emotional (mean = 554.4ms, S.E. = 12.9ms) and neutral (mean = 556.4ms, S.E. = 14.4ms) 
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cues did not differ significantly. Thus, the overall pattern of results in Group 2 reflected significant 
slowing by emotional cues on invalid trials at early, but not later, stages of processing. Figure 1 
shows the pattern of the data using index scores (reaction time to emotional cue minus neutral cue) 
to illustrate the degree of slowing across the different conditions for this group.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Group Three (‘euphoric’: high PA and low NA). For Group 3 the follow up Cue Duration (short, 
long) x Trial Type (valid, invalid) x Emotion (emotional, neutral) repeated measures ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of Trial Type, (F(1,19) = 46.9, p <0.001, partial 2  = 0.71), with 
reaction times slower on valid (554.3ms, S.E. = 12.3 ms) than invalid (mean = 533.1ms, S.E. = 
12.7ms) trials. No other effects were significant.  
 
Group Four (‘low affect’: low PA and NA). As noted previously the sample size for this group was 
too low for meaningful analysis.   
 
Regression analysis. We conducted a regression analysis to examine the relationship between 
dysphoria and attentional disengagement from emotional faces, in order to selectively test the 
significant findings for Group 2 (dysphoric) across the whole sample. The dependent measure was 
an emotional bias index calculated by subtracting neutral cued trials from emotional cued trials, 
meaning that a larger index reflected greater slowing by emotional relative to neutral cues.  We ran 
a linear regression on invalid trials presented at short cue durations, entering the individual 
difference variables as predictors (PA, NA, BDI and STAI).  The model was significant, F (4, 69) = 
2.78, p = .034, with the combined effect of predictors accounting for just under 15% of the variance 
in attentional disengagement from emotion (R = .382; R2 = 0.146; adjusted R2 = .094).  Further 
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details of the model are shown in Table 3 and reveal that negative affect and depression were both 
independently significant predictors of early disengagement. 
 
Table 3. Linear regression model showing predictors of attentional disengagement from emotion at 
short (< 100ms) cue durations 
 
Predictor β t p Partial 
correlation 
PA -.22 -1.72 0.09 -0.21 
NA .44 2.27 0.03 0.27 
BDI -.38 -2.40 0.02 -0.29 
STAI-trait -.22 -.97 0.34 -0.12 
 
β = standardized Beta coefficient; NA= negative affect; PA = positive affect; BDI= Beck 
Depression Inventory; STAI-trait = Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, trait version. Bold 
denotes independently significant predictor. 
 
 
3. Discussion 
Our study revealed significantly different patterns of attentional orienting to emotional 
information associated with different combinations of PA and NA levels. One group in particular 
revealed distinct orienting patterns, the dysphoric group (those with high NA but low PA).  At early 
stages of processing (<=100ms), dysphoria was associated with impaired disengaging of attention 
from emotional faces. Specifically, dysphoric participants were slower on emotional than neutral 
invalid trials at short cue durations, an effect which was not apparent on valid trials or at later 
stages of processing. Regression analysis on a subset of the experimental data but using the entire 
sample suggested a similar pattern in which the higher an individual’s level of negative affect, the 
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slower they were to disengage from early emotional cues.  Eye movement data confirmed that the 
subset of participants sampled generally kept their eyes centrally fixated. Assuming this was 
representative of the entire sample, it suggested that the effects found were primarily the result of 
covert as opposed to overt attention, as is often assumed, but rarely evidenced, by studies using this 
paradigm. 
The data suggest that, in line with the previous subclinical literature, dysphoric individuals 
are slow to disengage attention from emotional information at early stages of processing. The data 
are consistent with the speculation that patterns of orienting of attention might be qualitatively 
different in subclinical versus clinical populations.  We chose this categorical approach in 
preference to a dimensional design in order to most closely map the present data onto the previous 
subclinical literature, which has almost exclusively compared discrete groups selected to differ in 
trait anxiety/depression level.  We wished to examine whether those findings would replicate in our 
trait affect defined groups, or alternatively, whether results would now align more closely to the 
opposite findings recently reported in clinical (GAD) samples (e.g. Yiend et al 2015). 
Fit with hypothesis and existing literature. The pattern of delayed disengagement from 
emotional material in our dysphoric group could be considered consistent with a range of other 
findings in the literature. For example, depressed patients showed reduced inhibition of return 
relative to controls in an emotional cueing paradigm with angry faces (Leyman et al. 2007) and 
three studies have found that dysphoric students (defined according to self report low mood, as 
opposed to trait affect levels) show reduced inhibition of negative words (Koster et al. 2005, 
Leyman et al. 2007, Koster et al. 2010). Furthermore attentional blink paradigms using word 
stimuli have generated similar results (Koster et al. 2009). Several experts have concluded that 
attentional bias is only observed in depression when stimulus presentation duration is long 
(typically over 1000ms; e.g. Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). However, in a 
more recent meta-analysis investigating the magnitude of attentional bias in depression, Peckham 
Affect and Attention  
 
18 
 
and colleagues (Peckham, McHugh & Otto, 2010) found no moderating effect of stimulus duration. 
They found very similar effect sizes for studies using 500ms and those using 1000ms or more and 
concluded that there was no empirical support for the hypothesis that the bias is optimally found at 
longer stimulus durations. Our findings accord with this view.  
Anomolous findings. In contrast, the effects reported here were unlike some previous results 
in that they applied irrespective of the category of emotional information. It is possible that this was 
due to insufficient power within the present design to detect emotion specific effects. However, this 
is an unlikely explanation because the task design was powered on previous similar tasks in which 
individual differences between types of emotional stimuli have been detected (e.g. Yiend et al. 
2015; Yiend & Mathews, 2001). Specifically, we allowed for a minimum of 30 observations per 
cell (60 on valid trials) with factors Emotion, Cue Duration and Trial Type included.  An 
alternative explanation is that a more general bias towards emotion-relevant information operates at 
early stages of processing in dysphoria, only differentiating between specific types of emotion at 
later stages. Indeed, with respect to dysphoria, the specific mood congruent pattern found in 
previous emotional cueing studies has usually been at much later stages of processing ranging from 
1000ms (Donaldson et al. 2007, Joorman & Gotlib 2007) to 1550ms (Koster et al. 2010). Thus it is 
possible that early, non-specific emotion processing is followed by more selective processing at 
later stages. It is perhaps only at this later point that positive information is ignored or suppressed 
and negative information selectively attended. It is important to acknowledge however that some 
findings remain inconsistent with this suggested pattern. For example Gotlib and colleagues (2005) 
reported dysphoria associated with increased inhibition of negatively valenced words and Koster 
and colleagues (2009) found emotional specificity in dysphoria at short durations. Indeed the recent 
meta-analysis by Peckham et al. (2010) suggests that differences in orienting across durations in 
depression do no constitute a significant, reliable pattern. Difficulties in reconciling the different 
findings include the wide differences in methodology and sample selection, as well as precisely 
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how to define what constitutes ‘late’ versus ‘early’ stages of processing and only further research 
will be able to resolve this.  
Evaluating the trait affect approach. This is the first study to our knowledge to 
systematically investigate attentional orienting to emotion in groups differing in the orthogonal 
traits of positive and negative trait affect. The identification of a dysphoric group in our study based 
on the PANAS scales - rather than more traditional, but confounded, self-report measures of 
depression - is a key strength of the present investigation. In their Tripartite model, Watson et al. 
(1995) defined the lack of PA in depression as being the key distinguishing feature from anxiety 
and our dysphoric group was defined accordingly. Consistent with this, the dysphoric group was 
the only one to score significantly higher than the other groups on the traditional measure of 
depression, while not showing a corresponding pattern of differences on the traditional anxiety 
measure. This characterisation allows greater confidence in the validity of our findings of early 
slowed disengagement from emotion associated with dysphoria. While our data can only be 
preliminary and require replication, these findings suggest that an approach focussing on mutually 
exclusive orthogonal dimensions to differentiate individual differences could be a useful and valid 
means for investigating patterns of selective spatial attention, to identify the unique profiles 
associated with anxiety and depression.  
 
Wider implications of findings. Our findings suggest that early attentional processes could 
contribute to maintaining an individuals’ affective state, not only in the case of pathology (as has 
been argued previously) but also across a wider spectrum of general population level individual 
differences. If this working hypothesis is correct, it has important implications for our 
understanding of the role of attention to emotion not only in psychopathology, but also in health. In 
dysphoric individuals, for example, their affective state may be enhanced and maintained by 
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increased exposure to and processing of emotionally salient material, as a result of slow attentional 
disengagement.  
One question, recently raised in the literature, is whether there is a discontinuity between 
analogue and clinically anxious samples in their pattern of disengagement of attention. As noted 
earlier, most research into attention to emotion using analogue samples has suggested that negative 
attentional bias is due to slowed disengagement of attention from emotional information (e.g. 
Yiend, 2010), leading to the assumption that this pattern also characterises clinical anxiety. 
However, Yiend and colleagues (2015) noted that few, if any, previous studies have actually tested 
this assumption empirically. They then reported faster disengagement in their clinically anxious 
(GAD) group, while finding the expected impairments in a subclinical group. They suggested that 
once a clinical disorder has developed, the pattern of attentional disengagement might actually 
reverse.  Here we wished to examine whether those subclinical findings would replicate in our trait 
affect defined groups, or alternatively, whether results would now align more closely to the 
opposite findings reported in clinical (GAD) samples (Yiend et al 2015). It is clear that the present 
data replicate previous analogue findings, despite the ‘purer’ sample characteristics. An important 
next step will be to replicate the proposed pattern including a broader, subclinical and clinical, 
sample and using measures of positive and negative affect alongside traditional scales to contribute 
to the validity of the constructs being investigated.   
 
Limitations. Our study had several limitations including the small sample size, which 
decreased statistical power and rendered one of our groups (low affect) unavailable for meaningful 
analysis.  Nevertheless the presence of an overarching four-way interaction is decisive in 
confirming that group differences were present, and these could be clearly interpreted in the case of 
the other 3 groups. The multi-factorial design of our experiment was not well suited to an analytical 
approach using regression, despite the dimensionality of some of the constructs we were 
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examining. Although we addressed this post-hoc using a ‘hypothesis-driven’ regression on a subset 
of our data, it would be informative to conduct further experiments specifically designed to permit 
more complex dimensional modelling. Additionally, findings from a student sample are limited in 
their generalisability. There are also interpretative limitations; a confound sometimes raised when 
interpreting emotional cueing paradigms is the presence of a general slowing effect on emotional 
trials (Mogg Holmes, Garner, & Bradley 2008). Indeed there was such a non-spatial general 
slowing effect in this study, with participants on average 2ms slower on emotional than neutral 
trials. However, in line with the suggested solutions outlined by Yiend (2010) we found that 
correcting for this in spatial attentional analyses did not change the pattern or significance of our 
findings. 
Conclusions. The present work illustrates how the study of individual differences in PA and 
NA can enhance our understanding of selective attention to emotion. By using orthogonal 
personality constructs, as opposed to more popular but confounded dimensions such as trait 
depression and anxiety, it is possible to draw less ambiguous conclusions and ones which are 
potentially relevant not only to those with increased vulnerability to emotional disorders, but also to 
the wider spectrum of individual differences within the general population. In sum, the present 
research demonstrated dysphoric individuals had impaired disengagement from emotional faces at 
early stages of processing. There was no evidence of emotional specificity, suggesting early effects 
of emotion on attention may be relatively generic with regard to content. Overall these data suggest 
that early attentional processes may contribute to maintaining an individuals’ affective state by 
enhancing the processing of emotionally salient material in dysphoria.  
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